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Overview 
Australia is paying far too much for drugs on the Pharmaceutical 
Benefits Scheme. There are two ways to get a better deal. Earlier 
Grattan reports showed that government should negotiate better 
prices for drugs, as other countries do. This report examines a 
second solution: only paying for the best-value drug when 
cheaper drugs work just as well as more costly ones.  
The government’s current policy to avoid spending money on low-
value drugs is broken, and the waste amounts to $320 million a 
year. The idea behind the policy is good, but its implementation is 
all wrong.  
Some PBS drugs are interchangeable. Although these drugs are 
equally effective and safe for most people, their prices vary. For 
the expensive options, drug companies are charging more than 
their drug is worth. The extra costs do not reflect extra benefits for 
patients, and they are mostly paid by the government. 
A policy called the therapeutic group premium aims to stop the 
government wasting money on over-priced drugs. If a patient gets 
an expensive drug when a cheaper one is just as good, the 
patient pays part of the extra cost through a premium. Patients 
can avoid the premium by switching to the better value drug. If a 
patient faces a health risk from taking the cheaper option, their 
doctors can get the premium waived.  
This policy has been in place since 1998, but it has been so 
watered down that it no longer works. An arbitrary rule allows 
more and more drugs to escape the policy. The loophole makes 
premiums smaller and less frequently applied. Premiums shrink 
further due to the data and statistical adjustments that are used to 
calculate them. Both the data and the adjustments are chosen by 
the pharmaceutical industry.  
As a result, there are now premiums on only two drugs. Even 
these are far too low. Patients don’t seem to know about these 
fees and, predictably, they do not switch to cheaper drugs. 
The government should implement the policy as it was intended. 
Australia should compare broader groups of drugs, as it used to 
do and as other countries still do. Premiums should be calculated 
using comprehensive data, not surveys selected by drug 
companies. Patients should be told if they will pay a premium so 
they can switch drugs to avoid it. Getting the policy right would cut 
government spending without risking health. In the longer term, 
patients will save too. 
This policy is not the only problem with PBS pricing. The PBS 
routinely pays many times what other countries and state 
governments pay for the same drug. Even policies that do work to 
cut prices, such as price disclosure, should be much stronger. To 
get better value, Australia should establish an independent drug 
purchasing agency, like New Zealand’s PHARMAC, to negotiate 
drug prices and administer the therapeutic group premium policy. 
The government faces tough decisions about its budget, and 
meeting future health care needs. Getting a better deal for drugs 
is not one of these tough decisions. It should be easy. It is time for 
the government to make that choice.  
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Summary of recommendations 
 
How to fix the policy 
 
The government should … 
Compare more drugs by 
x Reinstating drugs that have had price disclosure cuts 
x Adding new therapeutic groups of drugs 
x Assigning all new drugs to a therapeutic group  
Tell doctors and patients about their options by 
x Launching an information campaign 
x Asking medical clinic software providers to prompt prescribers 
 
The Health Department should … 
Make price comparisons fair and accurate by 
x Using comprehensive data instead of surveys 
x Abandoning conservative statistical tests 
 
 
How to fix the system 
 
The government should … 
Make value a priority by 
x Establishing an independent PBS purchasing agency 
x Publishing regular independent reports on value in the PBS  
 
The Health Department should … 
Set clear boundaries for vested interests by 
x Adopting guidelines for working with lobby groups 
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1 Getting value from drug spending is the right policy …    
The Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme (PBS) subsidises hundreds 
of medicines. Many of them treat the same disease. For example, 
there are dozens of different drugs that treat high blood pressure.  
Some of these drugs can be clustered into therapeutically 
equivalent groups. These groups of drugs have similar safety and 
health outcomes and are interchangeable for most people.1  
Unless there is a good reason, such as an allergy or other 
reaction to a drug, the cheapest therapeutic equivalent drug 
should be used. Otherwise, money is wasted on a more 
expensive drug that is no better than a cheaper one. 
Figure 1 shows an example of two interchangeable drugs. 
Atorvastatin and rosuvastatin both reduce cholesterol. For most 
people they are equivalent in terms of safety, effectiveness and 
side-effects. A 20 milligram pill of atorvastatin is interchangeable 
with a 10 milligram pill of rosuvastatin, but a box of atorvastatin 
pills costs $13.63 while a box of rosuvastatin pills costs $26.68, 
almost twice the price.2 
                                            
1 Department of Health (2015a). Exceptions to interchangeability are discussed 
below. Therapeutic equivalent groups include different drugs. Groups with the 
same active substance (the same molecule) are sometimes also referred to this 
way, but we refer to them as generic groups. 
2 Both are 30-pill packs. Prices are dispensed price per maximum quantity – 
retail prices may vary due to discretionary mark-ups and discounts. See the 
methodological appendix for more information on the analysis in this report. 
Figure 1: Two interchangeable drugs for lowering cholesterol 
% reduction in LDL cholesterol 
 
Source: Australian Medicines Handbook (2015)  
Therapeutic premium policies around the world 
British Colombia in Canada and several European countries, 
including Germany, the Netherlands and Hungary, have policies 
to promote prescribing of the cheapest drug within therapeutic 
groups.3  
                                            
3 Dylst, et al. (2012). Therapeutic equivalent prescribing programs are also 
common in Australian hospitals. As one example, a group of hospitals and clinics 
in Melbourne introduced a therapeutic substitution program in 2006-07 and three 
years later it was saving around $1 million a year and growing, Larmour, et al. 
(2011).  
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In these jurisdictions, the government pays a fixed subsidy for any 
drug in a therapeutic group. Usually this price is the cost of the 
cheapest drug in the group.4 If patients get one of the more 
expensive drugs, they pay the extra cost. 
The policy can cut government spending on over-priced drugs by 
putting pressure on drug companies to cut their price. Otherwise, 
their drug will have a premium and patients may switch drugs to 
avoid it (at least one drug without a premium is always available). 
It can also prompt doctors and patients to choose better value 
drugs.5 Importantly, it does not seem to create the drawbacks of 
other ways of cutting government spending on medicine, such as 
across-the-board co-payment increases that can stop people from 
taking their medicines.6 
Since 1998, the PBS has had this policy too. It is called the 
therapeutic group premium.7 It should not be confused with the 
                                            
4 Belgium, Croatia, Latvia, New Zealand, Poland, Slovakia, and British Columbia 
use the lowest price. Denmark uses the average of the two lowest prices. Since 
2006 Germany has set prices at the top of the lowest third of the distribution. The 
Netherlands uses the product with the price below the average. Ioannides-
Demos, et al. (2002); Kaló, et al. (2008); Paris and Docteur ibid.; Voncina and 
Strizrep (2011); Szmurlo, et al. (2014). 
5 A Cochrane review found that internal reference pricing (benchmarking within 
either generic or therapeutic groups) may decrease government/insurer costs 
and prompt shifting to drugs without premiums (but evidence quality was low), 
Acosta, et al. (2014). A systematic review, Lee, et al. (2012), found falls in 
patient and payer costs (not consumption) without significant increases in doctor 
visits or hospitalisations (except one finding of a short term jump in doctor visits 
which dissipated and may be due to prescription switching). Excluding a minority 
of studies on generic substitution does not affect these findings.   
6 Lee, et al. (2012)  
7 Ioannides-Demos, et al. (2002) 
brand price premium, which applies to identical drugs (generics) 
that are made by different manufacturers. The therapeutic group 
premium applies to drugs that are chemically different, but 
interchangeable in their impact. 
How therapeutic group premiums are supposed to work  
The Health Minister determines therapeutic groups drawing on 
advice from the Pharmaceutical Benefits Advisory Committee, an 
expert body that also advises on whether drugs should be 
included on the PBS.8  
Patient payments for PBS drugs are capped at either $37.70, 
$6.10 or zero for different types of patient.9 When a drug costs 
more than this, the government pays the extra cost.  
But for drugs in a therapeutic group, the government limits how 
much it will pay.10 It only covers the cost of the cheapest drug. 
Then drug companies make a choice. They can cut their drug’s 
price to what the government is willing to pay or pass on the extra 
costs to patients through an additional fee: the therapeutic group 
                                            
8 Commonwealth of Australia (2015) 
9 General patients pay a maximum of $37.70 at the pharmacist. Concession 
patients pay a maximum of $6.10. After patients reach the PBS Safety Net 
threshold (a certain level of expenditure in a year), these maximum fees fall (to 
$6.10 for non-concession patients and zero for concession patients). Some 
surcharges above these limits apply, such as the therapeutic group premium that 
is the topic of this report. 
10 Premiums only apply to drugs that the government helps to pay for (not drugs 
under the maximum co-payment threshold). 
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premium.11 Figure 2 shows the way the system is intended to 
work. 
In cases where a patient should not change drugs for health 
reasons, doctors can order exclusions from the therapeutic group 
premium. The exclusions can be due to drug reactions, drug 
interactions or if changing drugs is likely to confuse the patient.12  
This report looks at how the policy is run and whether it is 
working. It explains its impact and flaws, and ways to fix both this 
specific policy and drug pricing more broadly. It shows that poor 
implementation has undermined the policy’s intention. It does not 
investigate other ways to promote dispensing of more cost 
effective, therapeutic equivalent drugs.13  
 
                                            
11 A mix of price cuts and premiums is also allowed. The premium does not 
count towards the Safety Net, beyond which patients pay less. 
12 Department of Health (2014a) 
13 Examples are: policies which place financial incentives on doctors, instead of 
patients (such as Germany’s physician drug budgets; drug substitution by 
pharmacists (which is not allowed under Australia’s therapeutic group premium 
policy); or New Zealand’s approach of only subsiding one or two drugs that are 
therapeutically equivalent. This report does not evaluate these options. 
Figure 2: The idea behind the policy: government pays for what 
works 
 
Note: Hypothetical example for non-concession patients above the PBS Safety Net 
threshold. 
Source: Grattan Institute 
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2 But its implementation is flawed …    
The idea behind the therapeutic group premium is good, but there 
are three flaws in how it is implemented. First, the policy ignores 
many interchangeable drugs. Second, the premiums patients 
must pay are too low, exposing the government to the cost of 
over-priced drugs. Third, patients are not fully informed about the 
policy, leaving them no chance to respond by choosing a cheaper 
option. 
2.1 Few groups and narrow groups 
The fewer drugs that the policy applies to, the less impact it will 
have. Australia’s scheme is very narrow, with only four groups:  
x angiotensin II antagonists (most often used to reduce blood 
pressure) 
x H2-receptor antagonists (to reduce gastric acid) 
x proton pump inhibitors (to reduce gastric acid) 
x venlafaxine and venlafaxine derivatives (antidepressants). 
Germany, by contrast, has more than 30 groups (see Box 1) and 
in the Netherlands all drugs are included in a therapeutic group.14  
                                            
14 Germany also has generic and multi-drug product groups. All groups cover 
over 60% of prescribing, Kanavos and Reinhardt (2003). In the Netherlands only 
therapeutically unique drugs that are the first pharmacological treatment for 
previously intractable conditions are exempt, Ioannides-Demos, et al. (2002).  
Box 1: Germany’s therapeutic groups (selected) 
x ACE inhibitors 
x Alpha-blockers 
x Aminoquinolines 
x Angiotensin II antagonists 
x Anticoagulants, oral 
x Antidiabetics (derived from 
Sulphonylurea) 
x Antipsychotics 
x Azole antifungals                      
x Benzodiazepines 
x Beta-blockers 
x Calcitonins 
x Cardiac glycosides 
x Dimethicone and simethicone 
x Diuretics 
x Fibrates 
x Fluoroquinolones 
x Glucocorticoids, oral                  
x H2-antagonists                         
x Heparins, low molecular 
x Insulins 
x Macrolides (newer) 
x Prostaglandin synthase 
x Selective serotonin reuptake 
inhibitors 
x Serotonin 5HT3 antagonists             
x Statins 
x Testosterone-5-alpha 
reductase 
x Triazoles 
Source: Statutory Health Insurance Funds Association (Germany) (2012) 
 
In Australia, not only are there few groups, they are shrinking in 
number and size. Legislation excludes any drug that has had a 
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price cut due to a separate policy called price disclosure.15 Since 
a growing list of nearly 300 drugs can get price disclosure cuts, 
this clause has had a big impact on therapeutic groups.  
The reason is to avoid comparing the prices of drugs that face 
competition between multiple brands (such as those that go 
through price disclosure cuts) with prices of drugs that are still 
under patent and do not have multiple brands. But this rule makes 
little sense. The drugs are equivalent, even if the number of 
brands for each drug is not. The government should seek the best 
value among interchangeable drugs, whether or not low prices are 
driven by brand competition. 
To take one example, the blood pressure therapeutic group has 
five drugs. There are two other drugs of the same type listed on 
the PBS – candesartan and irbesartan – but in 2014 they were 
removed from the group because of price disclosure. Other 
countries with a similar group keep them in.16 
Drugs have been removed from all four therapeutic groups in 
recent years because of price disclosure.17 Whole therapeutic 
                                            
15 National Health Act 1953, Commonwealth of Australia (2015). Price disclosure 
cuts the wholesale price of drugs to reflect the discounts that manufacturers and 
distributors give to pharmacists, bringing the price closer to the real cost of the 
drug in the market. As discussed in previous reports, the policy is flawed, 
containing loopholes that reduce price disclosure reductions (e.g. purchases in 
the first month of each reporting period are not included, reductions of less than 
10% do not count), Duckett, et al. (2013). 
16 Such as Germany. 
17 In 2014 candesartan and irbesartan were removed from the angiotensin II 
antagonists group and rabeprazole was removed from the proton pump inhibitor 
group. In 2013 cimetidine and ranitidine were removed from the H2-receptor 
antagonists group and venlafaxine was removed from the venlafaxine and 
groups, such as the groups for statins, have been shut down. Two 
of these cholesterol-lowering drugs, atorvastatin and rosuvastatin, 
were the most costly drugs for government in 2013-14, costing the 
PBS $570 million.18  
Removing drugs from therapeutic groups weakens the policy. Like 
any shopper looking for a good deal, the government will get 
better value if it compares the price of a greater number of 
interchangeable products. A drug that is dropped might be the 
cheapest drug, so the government no longer gets the best 
possible deal. Perversely, it is drugs that have been through price 
disclosure cuts that are left out of the groups – drugs that are 
likely to be the cheapest option.  
Even if the drug that is removed is not the cheapest in the group, 
the government still loses. If the drug had stayed in the group, its 
price would fall to match its cheapest competitor. If the drug is 
dropped from the group, its price can stay high. 
2.2 Few premiums and low premiums 
The PBS website describes the therapeutic group premium policy 
in this way: “The Australian Government, through the PBS, 
subsidises up to the price of the lowest priced drug in the 
group.”19  
                                                                                    
venlafaxine derivatives group. See amendments PB7 and PB77 of 2013, and 
PB23 and PB80 of 2014 to the National Health Act 1953. 
18 Department of Health (2015b). The final statin group was abolished in 2014 
when only one drug remained (as required by the Act).  
19 Department of Health (2014a) 
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But the way drug premiums are set is not that simple, or that 
sensible. It is needlessly complex and opaque – a “kludge” (see 
definition in Box 2) that obscures the policy’s failure to achieve its 
objective. 
There is no defending the way the government calculates 
therapeutic group premiums. The steps in the process are shown 
in Box 3. At every step, the current process reduces both the 
likelihood of premiums being charged and their likely size, as the 
following sections show.  
The statistics are significant 
To calculate the price cut or premium a drug should attract, the 
government needs to compare the prices of drugs within a 
therapeutic group. To overcome the fact that drugs come in 
different doses (such as 20mg), each with its own price, the 
government sets a weighted average price for each drug. The 
weighted average is calculated from the price of all doses of a 
drug, but is skewed towards the more commonly used ones. That 
skew reflects how the drug is used in practice and how much it 
typically costs to treat a patient with that drug. 
To determine how much a drug is being used, the government 
consults surveys about prescribing. A survey of about 1000 GPs, 
each recording about 100 patient visits, is often used.20 The result 
of this approach is that estimates are based on a small number of 
                                            
20 The BEACH survey of GPs, Britt, et al. (2014). Only a minority of these will 
involve relevant prescribing and the sample size will be further reduced through 
data cleaning. 
observations. In fact, a drug can be selected as the cheapest 
based on as few as 65 recorded prescriptions.  
Box 2: A victory for kludge?  
If your eyes glaze over when you read about how therapeutic 
group premiums are calculated, you are suffering from kludge. 
The term originally referred to a clumsy but expedient software 
patch: an inelegant workaround for a short-term problem. The 
problem with kludges is that they accumulate and linger, making 
software complex, unstable, unreliable and hard to maintain. 
Political scientist Steven Teles has applied the term to public 
policy. He argues that kludges lead to waste and confusion and 
create opportunities that vested interests can exploit: 
“Policy complexity is valuable for those seeking to extract rents 
from government because it muddies the waters, making it hard to 
see just who is benefitting and how, and so obscuring the actual 
mechanism of political action that it is difficult to mobilize against 
it”.21 
Kludges – like the redundant statistical manipulations used to set 
therapeutic group premiums – help obscure the failures in how a 
policy works. Some commentators in America suggest that 
lobbyists actively cultivate kludge for this very reason.22 Given the 
close involvement of lobbyists in the design and implementation of 
the therapeutic group premium policy, it may be a case in point. 
 
                                            
21 Teles (2012) 
22 See Wallach (2015), a review of Drutman (2015). 
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Drawing conclusions about Australia from such a small sample is 
risky. There is a good chance the surveyed doctors will not 
represent prescribing by all doctors in the country. The 
government employs a test known as statistical significance to 
see whether a conclusion drawn from a sample is likely to reflect 
the broader population.23 It checks whether the gaps between the 
weighted drug prices it has calculated pass this test. If they do 
not, they are ignored. 
Checking for statistical significance when using data of this kind is 
sensible, but it creates a problem. The smaller the sample, the 
further apart weighted prices must be before they are significantly 
different. Because price differences are calculated using a small 
amount of data, many are not considered significant. Yet the price 
gaps still exist and cost the government millions of dollars a year. 
To make the process even more conservative, there are two 
different tests for significance: one for the group as a whole and 
another that compares each drug to the cheapest drug.24 The 
comparisons between individual drugs should suffice. Adding a 
test for the whole group is redundant and can lead to more price 
gaps being ignored. 
 
                                            
23 For a non-technical explanation of statistical significance and its limitations see 
Figueiredo Filho, et al. (2013). 
24 The first is a global chi-square test, the second is a pair-wise z-test. Both tests 
must find significant difference. Yet another conservative choice is how the 
cheapest drug is chosen. It is not the drug with the lowest weighted average. 
Instead, it is the drug with the lowest upper confidence interval. In other words, 
instead of using the most likely price, the highest probable price is used. 
Box 3: How therapeutic premiums are calculated 
x Drug companies suggest a data source from a list of allowed 
options, including several surveys of what GPs prescribe. If 
more than one source is nominated, the Health Department 
chooses which source to use and that choice is fixed for three 
years (unless a drug company contests it).  
x Drug companies clean the data, removing entries that are 
incomplete, improbable or incorrect and submit it to the Health 
Department for review and analysis.25 
x The government enters the data into a spreadsheet that 
adjusts current prices according to prescribing volumes and 
generates a national estimate. It identifies a benchmark drug: 
the drug with the lowest upper 95 per cent confidence interval.  
x For a price cut or premium to occur, first a statistical test must 
find a significant difference between drug prices in the group. 
Then a different statistical test must find a significant 
difference between a single drug’s adjusted price and the 
benchmark drug’s adjusted price.  
x The government provides the spreadsheet and its results to 
drug companies and invites them to propose any changes to 
their prices. 
x If their price is significantly higher than the cheapest drug, 
companies can choose to reduce the price they charge the 
government, or charge a premium, or a mix of both. 
Source: Department of Health (2009) 
                                            
25 Both cleaned and original data are provided, with explanations of adjustments. 
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Fortunately, all of these statistical hurdles are unnecessary. Since 
2012, the government has had comprehensive dispensing data.26 
Because it now knows exactly which drugs are being dispensed 
through the PBS, there is no longer any need to use survey data 
or conservative statistical manipulations.27 But the way the policy 
works has not been updated to take advantage of this opportunity. 
As well as being unnecessary and inaccurate, the data 
manipulations are costly, time-consuming and impose a 
significant red tape burden on drug companies. The 
pharmaceutical industry lobby group, Medicines Australia, has 
complained that the process “generates substantial financial and 
administrative costs to both the Government and industry”.28 In 
2008, they estimated the cost of purchasing survey data at 
$110,000 to $120,000 a year for each company, on top of the 
burden of collecting, collating and analysing data, and verifying 
calculations.29 
Although the industry has complained about the process, it had a 
great influence over its development. The process for comparing 
prices was designed by a series of working groups that included 
industry lobby groups.30 The cascade of statistical tests described 
above was designed by “industry experts” after a joint 
                                            
26 Including for drugs which were paid for without a government subsidy (‘under 
co-payment’ purchases), where community pharmacy industry data was 
previously the most reliable source. 
27 These data are far superior to the surveys, but are not perfect. One source of 
inaccuracy is that the data will not count prescriptions that were never filled. 
28 In a submission to the Productivity Commission on regulatory burdens, Shaw 
(2008). 
29 Ibid. 
30 Medicines Australia and the Generic Medicines Industry Association. 
government-industry working group rejected different statistical 
methods proposed by an independent review.31 
The extent and timing of industry involvement in the process may 
also create opportunities for gaming. Drug companies nominate 
data sources and buy and clean the data, all of which must then 
be policed by the Health Department.  
In addition, drug companies are only asked to cut prices or 
impose a premium after they know how big the statistically 
significant gaps are. If significant price gaps are found, they are in 
a good position to cut their price as little as possible, keeping 
price differences but keeping them small enough to avoid 
statistical significance.32 In fact, the government publishes a 
manual that gives explicit instructions about how to maximise 
prices while minimising the risk of a premium.33  
                                            
31 An independent review by Ernst and Young proposed bootstrapping. A 
government manual notes that a joint Pharmaceutical Benefits Branch (Health 
Department) and Medicines Australia (pharmaceutical industry lobby group) 
working group responded to the report by agreeing the approach described in 
this chapter, Department of Health (2009). 
32 This is especially true as they have the same prescribing data and price-
weighting spreadsheet as the Health Department. 
33 An example in the manual explains how to reduce the z-score, which tests the 
significance of the difference between adjusted prices, to just below 1.96, the 
point at which a therapeutic premium would be imposed. It goes on to provide 
further tips: “Of course, there are still the strategic questions of whether one 
strength is more important to a [drug company] than the others, and how much 
of a buffer to leave against possible surprise developments.”, Department of 
Health (2009). 
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The result: premiums often don’t exist or are small 
When drug companies don’t cut their prices to match the best 
value option in a therapeutic group, premiums are supposed to 
stop the government paying too much. Given all the flaws in how 
they are calculated, it is no surprise that the premiums do not 
achieve this in practice. 
There have never been many drugs with premiums, but having so 
few groups, conservative statistical hurdles and a rule that 
excludes so many drugs has caused the number to fall to the 
current record low of two. The premiums are both in the blood 
pressure drug group (angiotensin II antagonists) and are $3.50.34  
There are five drugs in this group. To check whether these two 
premiums are doing their job, we looked at a set of doses 
(olmesartan 20mg, for example) that are interchangeable. The 
premiums should cover the gap between the cost of any of these 
doses and the cheapest alternative in the group.  
Figure 3 shows that the cheapest option costs $12.40 while the 
most expensive costs more than $30. But the current calculations 
result in a premium of just $3.50 – not even close to covering the 
gap between these prices. For patients who have a concession or 
have reached the Safety Net, the government must pay $7.10 or 
                                            
34 One is rounded up from $3.49. All dollar figures in this section are rounded to 
the nearest 10c for clarity, but this does not affect per cent figures. 
$17.70 beyond the cost of the cheapest drug.35 For one drug, the 
premium covers half the total gap. For the other, it covers just one 
fifth.  
Not just that, other drugs in the therapeutic group have no 
premiums at all. Their prices are not considered different in a 
statistical sense, but in reality their prices are different: each box 
of pills costs either $1.90 or $5.80 more than the cheapest 
alternative. In 2013-14, the PBS subsidised over two million of 
packs of these pills. 
The premiums that exist cover just eight per cent of government 
expenditure beyond the price of the cheapest drug, or $2 million 
out of $22 million. The premiums perform even worse if you 
compare the drugs that should be in the group. The original group 
included irbesartan and candesartan, but they were removed 
because of price disclosure cuts.  
The way premiums are set wastes a big opportunity. If premiums 
covered the full cost gaps for the seven therapeutic groups 
Australia had in the past, it would save the government $320 
million a year, or fund more than 60,000 hospital visits (see Figure 
                                            
35 Our aim here is to see how the policy plays out for doses that are widely 
regarded as substitutable, Pharmacist’s Letter/Prescriber’s Letter (2013); 
Department of Health (2014b). We only look at specific doses, so the premium 
should not necessarily cover exactly the gaps we find, but to achieve their aim 
they should at least come close. See Figure 3 notes for more information. 
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4).36 Many other therapeutic groups could be added, potentially 
saving much more. 
Figure 3: The therapeutic group premium covers a fraction of the 
real cost gap 
Costs paid by patients and government (concession patients and 
general patients after Safety Net) per month 
$ 
 
 
Notes: Prices are dispensed price per maximum quantity plus therapeutic group premium. 
Doses are 50mg, 40mg, 80mg, 20mg, 600mg (left-to-right), which are WHO defined daily 
doses and also considered equivalent in guidance such as McAuley (2015). Prices are 
adjusted for pack size. See methodological appendix for more information. 
Source: Grattan Institute based on Department of Health (2015c). 
 
                                            
36 These calculations assume reintroduction of drugs that have had price 
disclosure cuts and an increase in the rate of clinical exclusions by fivefold to 
5%. See the methodological appendix for more information. 
Figure 4: With premiums that covered the full cost gaps, the 
government would save $320 million a year for seven groups alone 
 
Source: Grattan Institute using PBS data 
 
 
2.3 The policy leaves patients and doctors in the dark 
Patients don’t choose their drugs, their doctor does. In Germany, 
the doctor is required to tell patients if they order a drug that has a 
therapeutic group premium.37 Australia has no such requirement.  
Patients and doctors appear to be largely unaware of the 
premiums. Doctors only order an exemption for drugs with 
premiums one per cent of the time. It seems very unlikely that 
doctors would wilfully expose their patients to a premium 99 per 
cent of the time, and that patients would always accept it without 
requesting a different drug. A much more likely explanation is that 
most doctors and their patients are not aware of the policy. 
                                            
37 Danzon and Ketcham (2004) 
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Even if patients find out about the premium at the pharmacy, they 
will need a new prescription to avoid the surcharge. That might 
require calling their doctor, visiting a clinic or even waiting for a 
new appointment, any of which is likely to be more difficult and 
costly than simply paying the premium.  
Even though patients might not be informed about the surcharge, 
in 2013-14 they paid $1.8 million in premiums on the two drugs 
that have them.38 Many might not have known they were paying 
the premiums. They have a right to know. 
As this chapter shows, the premiums don’t cover much of the cost 
gap they are supposed to cover. The next chapter shows that the 
premiums have very little effect on which drugs are used or how 
much they cost. 
 
  
                                            
38 Calculated using current premiums and 2013-14 prescribing volumes. 
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3 As a result, the policy does not work well enough …    
How can we tell whether the therapeutic group premium is 
working? The policy can achieve three goals: it can shift costs 
from government to patients, prompt switching to better value 
drugs, or force drug companies to cut prices. There is no sign that 
the policy is achieving the first two objectives, but there seems to 
have been some progress in cutting drug prices. 
3.1 Barely any costs are shifted 
The main aim of Australia’s policy is to save the government 
money. A policy that worked would not just shift costs onto 
patients, it would also help them avoid the costs of over-priced 
drugs by giving them the option of cheaper ones. But the policy is 
failing even on the narrow objective of cost shifting. It only applies 
to two drugs, and saves the government less than $2 million a 
year.  
3.2 There is no noticeable impact on which drugs are used 
Prompting doctors and patients to choose better value drugs has 
not been stated as the primary aim of Australia’s policy, but it 
should be. Getting people to use better-value drugs would save 
money for patients too, not just the government.  
Similar policies have achieved drug switching overseas and it is 
clear why.39 If there is no health reason for an exemption, many 
doctors would be expected to prescribe a drug without a premium 
to save their patients money and avoid having to order an 
                                            
39 See footnote 5. 
exemption. Many patients would also be expected to ask for the 
cheaper option. 
But there is little evidence of drug switching in Australia. Four 
drugs and eight individual drug doses (such as 40mg or 20mg) 
have had a premium introduced in the last five years. All of them 
are in the blood pressure therapeutic group.40  
In some cases, doses lost market share after the premium was 
introduced. In some cases, they actually gained market share. But 
overall, their share of dispensing remained extremely stable.  
The introduction of premiums had no noticeable impact on 
previous trends, as Figure 5 shows. This is confirmed by further 
analysis in the methodological appendix, which found extremely 
small changes after the introduction of premiums. 
The premiums applied were likely too low to shift prescribing 
much, particularly when patients and doctors may not have been 
aware of them.  
                                            
40 We did not investigate earlier applications of premiums, as these did not 
commence during the period covered by our dataset. Earlier applications of the 
policy may have been more successful. 
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Figure 5: Premiums don’t have much impact on market share  
Share of angiotensin II antagonist dispensing 
 
Note: Doses with premiums introduced in 2011 and 2012. Market share among all doses of 
all ‘sartan’ drugs (excluding combination products). See methodological appendix for more 
information. 
Source: Grattan Institute analysis of PBS data. 
 
3.3 Premiums may be pushing prices down 
The policy could also force drug companies to compete with the 
best value alternatives.41 A company with a price above the 
lowest-cost choice might cut their price to reduce the premium on 
their drug, or remove it completely. 
By far the broadest and most active of the current therapeutic 
groups is the one for blood pressure drugs, which we looked at 
earlier. Prices have declined in this group, which is unsurprising. 
The price of a drug generally falls over time. When a drug goes 
off-patent, allowing multiple companies to produce it and compete 
by offering lower prices, the price often falls substantially.42 Prices 
may also fall because of price negotiations with the government or 
the need to compete against newly-invented drugs. 
Because drug prices often go down, falling prices alone do not 
prove that the therapeutic group premium is working to cut prices. 
If it is working, we would see bigger price declines for more 
expensive drugs: the drugs that risk having a premium if their 
prices stay high. 
In the last six years, the price of drugs in the blood pressure 
therapeutic group fell by four per cent a year, on average. But the 
price of the cheapest drugs fell more slowly, by less than one per 
cent.43  
                                            
41 The interchangeable drugs with the lowest price.  
42 The PBS also applies a cut of 16% when the first generic enters the market. 
43 The cheapest drug refers to the drug with the lowest weighted average 
monthly treatment cost in any month. Changes refer to annualised average 
monthly falls. See the methodological appendix for more information. 
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Although this is not conclusive, it does suggest the policy is 
having an impact.44 The Health Department also suggests that the 
policy has achieved substantial price cuts for drugs in other 
groups, which drug companies chose to concede rather than 
impose a premium.45  
While the policy seems to have made some progress in reducing 
drug prices, it has not done enough. Big price gaps between 
substitutable doses remain. These gaps cost the government over 
$20 million a year for the blood pressure group alone, as the 
previous chapter shows.46 
The therapeutic price premiums have done little to nudge 
prescribing in the right direction or to achieve the less beneficial 
goal of shifting costs from the government to patients. But it is 
encouraging that, despite being narrow and weak, the policy may 
have lowered the price of some drugs. If therapeutic price 
premiums are improved, they could achieve much more.  
 
                                            
44 Some of the difference may be explained by reversion to the mean. Our 
analysis uses a different benchmarking approach (therapeutic effect instead of 
prescribing volumes) so may identify different lowest-cost drugs. See the 
methodological appendix for more information. 
45 Such as high-potency statins, before this group was abolished, personal 
communication. 
46 This is the value of remaining price gaps after the premium is applied, using 
only the current group which excludes irbesartan and candesartan. 
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4 The problem and the system can be fixed
Fixing the policy 
The therapeutic group premium policy has been law for nearly 20 
years, under successive governments. But its design and 
implementation have reduced it to a hollow gesture.  
The policy is supposed to send a price signal to get patients to 
switch to drugs that are better value. But the signal is weak and 
the person who is supposed to respond to it – the patient – is 
probably unaware of it.  
To make the policy work, the government should: 
x change the legislation that excludes drugs that have had price 
disclosure cuts and restore the drugs and groups that were 
removed 
x include all newly listed drugs in a therapeutic group (unless 
they have no therapeutic equivalent) 
x introduce therapeutic groups that other countries have 
x calculate premiums based on dispensing data instead of 
surveys 
x ask the expert Pharmaceutical Benefits Advisory Committee 
for advice about whether groups should be more ambitious, in 
particular incorporating drugs that are more dissimilar, and 
creating groups for products that combine multiple drugs.47 
This will initially lead to more premiums and higher premiums. The 
government could consider capping the premiums at first, for 
example at $10.48 Whether or not premiums are capped, the 
government must make sure that doctors and patients understand 
these costs so they can switch to a cheaper option if it is safe to 
do so. 
When doctors prescribe a drug with a premium they should 
explain why to their patients. Just as they are now, doctors will be 
free to get an exemption (called an authority script) if there is a 
good reason that a patient needs a drug that normally has a 
premium.  
Government should take measures to ensure patients are well-
informed. Pharmacists should be required to tell patients if they 
are being charged a premium and the government should run an 
information campaign for prescribers, pharmacists and patients.49  
                                            
47 Australia’s groups are within Level 4 groups in the WHO system for 
classification of drugs (not strictly a system based on therapeutic equivalence). 
Some countries include drugs from the broader Level 3 groups, or even a mix of 
different levels. Examples are Latvia, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland and 
British Columbia, Zuidberg (2010); Province of British Columbia (2015). 
Germany has a separate category of therapeutic groups that largely focuses on 
combination doses (multiple drugs provided in one pill). 
48 This and having no premiums under $1 would cut savings to $230 million p.a. 
49 Such a campaign accompanied the original introduction of therapeutic group 
premiums, with $3.2 million in government funding over two years, plus 
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The companies that make software for medical practices should 
also help. These systems should remind doctors when they 
prescribe a drug with a premium. This will be much easier for 
doctors than keeping track of premiums. 
Once premiums are larger, and patients and doctors are aware of 
them, patients will be far more likely to switch drugs. As a result, 
drug companies will reduce their prices, which will ultimately save 
money for patients, as well as the government.50  
The policy will reduce profits for drug companies. There may be 
claims that this reduces research and development. But savings 
of $320 million a year, spread across numerous multinational drug 
companies, are very unlikely to have a meaningful impact on 
pharmaceutical research investment. To the extent that research 
and development is influenced, there will be a positive impact. 
Companies will be more likely to avoid crowded therapeutic 
classes of drugs, focusing instead on innovative treatments with 
distinctive benefits.51 
                                                                                    
additional spending by the Pharmacy Guild, Commonwealth of Australia (1997). 
Schneeweiss (2007) argues that without a substantial information campaign for 
patients, prescribers and pharmacists, a policy of this kind cannot be 
successfully implemented.  
50 Patients below the general co-payment threshold can benefit from price 
reductions, even though they do not face therapeutic price premiums. These 
patients can also save money from drug switching to non-premium products, 
which should be stimulated by our proposed information campaign for 
prescribers, pharmacists and patients. 
51 For a discussion of investments in so called “me-too” drugs, which offer little or 
no therapeutic benefit compared to existing therapies, see Gagne and Choudhry 
(2011); Light and Lexchin (2012); Olfson and Marcus (2013). 
Fixing the system 
The therapeutic group premium policy is just one problem with 
Australia’s pharmaceutical pricing policies. Previous Grattan 
reports found that the PBS routinely pays many times the prices 
that New Zealand, the UK and Australian public hospitals (which 
negotiate prices separately from the PBS) pay for the same 
generic medicines.52  
The Australian National Audit Office recently conducted an audit 
of how the Health Department administers the Community 
Pharmacy Agreement.53 The Agreement sets out how 
pharmacists are paid for dispensing medicines and other services. 
It governs spending of over $15 billion.54  
Among many negative findings, the audit reports that the Health 
Department: 
x over-estimated the savings the Agreement would generate 
savings 
x reallocated funding covered by the Agreement without 
authority 
x did not achieve explicit government objectives 
                                            
52 Duckett, et al. (2013) 
53 Commonwelath of Australia (2015) 
54 Ibid. 
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x did not keep formal records of meetings with the Pharmacy 
Guild (which represents pharmacy owners, who receive 
billions in funding from the Agreement) 
x is not in a good position to work out whether the Agreement is 
achieving value for money.55 
There is a pattern to these problems of high drug prices, poor 
administration of the Pharmacy Agreement and the therapeutic 
premium policy. A serious commitment to getting value for money 
is needed. A policy being announced is just the start of the story. 
It is worthless unless it is implemented properly. 
The pharmaceutical industry is too closely involved in how the 
Health Department designs and runs the therapeutic group 
premium. One part of the solution is to set up an independent 
body to set drug prices, including therapeutic premiums. New 
Zealand’s PHARMAC plays this role effectively.56  
More generally, the Health Department should keep lobby groups 
at arm’s length. Consultation with industry experts is crucial to 
getting policy right, but the risks of regulatory capture are real: 
                                            
55 A broader 2014 capability review of the Health Department also found serious 
problems. It evaluated the Department in ten domains with possible ratings of: 
strong; well-placed; development area; and serious concern. Only one domain 
was rated as well-placed, with seven development areas and two areas of 
serious concerns, Australian Public Service Commission (2014). 
56 Duckett, et al. (2013). New Zealand does not have a therapeutic group 
premium, although it does use therapeutic group pricing in a different way: by 
subsidising only the cheapest one or two therapeutic equivalents. 
senior Health Department employees have noted the risk of more 
junior staff being captured by influential stakeholders.57 
A Lobbying Code of Conduct applies to all Commonwealth public 
servants, but it only covers consultant lobbyists that work for third 
parties. It does not cover lobby groups for professional groups or 
members, such as Medicines Australia, the Generic Medicines 
Industry Association or the Pharmacy Guild.58 
To fill the gap, the Health Department should develop clear 
standards and processes for working with lobby groups. In this 
case, lobby group involvement seems to have gone well beyond 
appropriate consultation. The joint Health Department-industry 
working group is described as “agreeing” and “determining” how 
the policy is designed and implemented.59 New guidelines should 
make it clear that vested interests can be informed, consulted and 
debated, but that their agreement is not required before proposals 
go to the Health Minister. 
However prices, premiums and policies are set, there is too little 
scrutiny on whether the PBS is getting good value. The Health 
Department or the Pharmaceutical Benefits Advisory Committee 
should produce an annual PBS Performance Report that 
compares Australian prices to those in other countries and reports 
on whether policies such as the therapeutic price premium are 
doing their job. 
                                            
57 Australian Public Service Commission (2014) 
58 McKeown (2014) 
59 Department of Health (2009).  
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Decades ago, the PBS was one of the best and most innovative 
drug purchasing programs in the world, but it has fallen far 
behind. More of the same policies won’t put it back on track. A 
root-and-branch effort to fix both the formulation and 
implementation of PBS policies is required. 
The benefits are worth it 
The government is right to try to get better value for PBS drugs. 
But it should not get patients to pay more without their being 
informed. It should also run the policy as it was intended, instead 
of letting arbitrary rules minimise its impact.  
Done right, therapeutic group premiums would save the 
government hundreds of millions of dollars a year. Difficult 
choices are needed about taxes, government spending, reducing 
the deficit and meeting growing demand for health care. By 
contrast, fixing this policy should be an easy choice. It is a rare cut 
in health spending that won’t put people’s health at risk. After 
nearly 20 years, it is time that this policy did what it was supposed 
to do. 
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5 Methodological appendix
5.1 Data 
The analysis in this report is based on Pharmaceutical Benefits 
Scheme (PBS) date of supply data combined with PBS text files 
that are available at 
http://www.pbs.gov.au/info/publication/schedule/archive and 
current prices available at http:/www.pbs.gov.au. 
5.2 Costings 
To estimate cost savings we used the six therapeutic groups 
listed in the Weighted Average Monthly Treatment Cost Manual, 
as well as venlafaxine and derivatives group listed on the PBS 
website (which contained venlafaxine and desvenlafaxine).60  
We assumed that the drugs removed due to price disclosure cuts 
since 2009 were reinstated and that premiums were increased to 
cover the cost gaps between substitutes. All calculations use the 
dispensed price per maximum quantity. Savings were calculated 
using current prices and co-payment thresholds and 2013-14 
volumes from the dataset described above. In line with the current 
policy, we compared prices using weighted average monthly 
treatment costs.61  
These costings are indicative. We assumed that the rate of 
authority prescribing (clinical exemptions) for premium products 
increased by roughly five times to five per cent. This reflects the 
                                            
60 Ibid.; http://www.pbs.gov.au/browse/therapeutic-group 
61 Ibid. 
fact that the rate may increase with more and larger premiums 
and our proposed information campaign. We also increased the 
rate to reflect that, once premiums apply to all but one drug in a 
therapeutic group, there may be a small number of doses with a 
premium that do not have a direct pill-for-pill equivalent without a 
premium. If this is the case, the government could add a new 
category of exemption to cover these cases.  
It is hard to know whether the authority prescribing rate would be 
below or above five per cent. But our analysis remains 
conservative for other reasons. Dispensing will have increased 
since our data period of 2013-14 (even for this period, the 
volumes may increase as data are updated). We also excluded all 
combination products (which contain more than one drug) and 
only included pills and tablets (no sachets, injections or other 
forms). 
An alternative costing approach 
We also calculated savings another way, with price cuts or 
premiums for groups of interchangeable doses, rather than for 
drugs as a whole. This could be considered to avoid the drawback 
of drug-to-drug comparisons mentioned above (the risk of doses 
without direct, non-premium substitutes). 
We based the dose substitutions on Pharmaceutical Benefits 
Advisory Committee relativity sheets if they were comprehensive 
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and compared exact doses.62 Where this was not the case, we 
used the World Health Organisation’s defined daily doses 
(DDDs).63 The exception is statins, where we used the Australian 
Medicines Handbook and substituted based on LDL lowering 
effect.  
In addition to the exclusions and assumptions above, this costing 
did not assume substitution between tablets and capsules of 
different types (such as enteric-coated and non-enteric-coated). 
We only made single pill-for-pill substitutions, except in one case, 
were we substituted one pill with two pills. This method generated 
a savings estimate of $250 million a year. 
5.3 Interrupted time series analysis 
We used a linear regression to confirm that premiums had little, if 
any, impact on the market share of pharmaceutical products 
within their therapeutic group.  
The only premiums analysed are those that began within the 
period covered by the monthly data, and had at least an 18-month 
period before the introduction of the premium to allow the before-
and-after analysis described below.64  
                                            
62 Department of Health (2014b)  
63 See http://www.whocc.no/atc_ddd_index/. If this approach were adopted, we 
would recommend using systematic reviews of therapeutic impact to guide 
substitutions rather than DDDs, as this use of DDDs is not recommended by the 
WHO (although the Netherlands uses it in their therapeutic group pricing policy), 
Dukes (2003); Zuidberg (2010); World Health Organisation Collaborating Centre 
for Drug Statistics Methodology (2015). 
64 ‘Premiums’ refers to therapeutic group premiums, the topic of this report. 
These were premiums on candesartan, eprosartan, olmesartan 
and telmesartan. The premiums were applied in April 2011 
(candesartan) and April 2012 (others).  
There were changes in the coverage of the data during both 
periods. From July 2010, close-the-gap under co-payment data 
were included.65 From July 2012, under co-payment data were 
included. These patient categories were excluded.66 
Both patient categories were excluded from the dataset for the 
interrupted time series analysis. Patients under the co-payment 
are not exposed to therapeutic group premiums, so these patients 
are irrelevant to this analysis. 
Separate regressions were run for each of the eight angiotensin II 
inhibitor doses which had premiums introduced in 2011 or 2012. 
The period was 2009 to 2014.  
The dependent variable was the share of prescribing among 
‘pure’ angiotensin II inhibitors (excluding combination pills that 
include another drug). Independent variables were: time (in 
months); dummy variables for the presence of a 2011 or 2012 
premium to capture a drop in prescribing after the premium was 
applied; and interactions of time and the dummy variables to 
                                            
65 Under co-payment refers to dispensing that is paid for entirely by the patient, 
without a direct government subsidy. 
66 The close-the-gap category for the doses with a premium applied in 2011. The 
under co-payment data for doses with a premium applied in 2012. 
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capture any change in the trajectory of market share after the 
introduction of the premium.67 
Premium introduction (a one-off effect) only had a statistically 
significant association with a decline in market share for one of 
the eight doses. The coefficient was small: a 0.11 per cent fall in 
market share. Changes in the slope of market share after the 
introduction of the premium were statistically significant in only 
three cases. The largest fall was just -0.27 per cent (annually) and 
one coefficient was very slightly positive.  
To put these results in perspective, the statistically significant 
coefficient that points most strongly towards effectiveness (the 
0.27 per cent annual fall in market share) would take over 31 
years to bring the market share for that product to zero. This is not 
a projection – it simply extrapolates linearly (with compounding) – 
but it does illustrate how meagre the change was. Results of the 
regression are summarised in Figure 6. 
We tested another model with a six month time lag in case the 
premiums had a delayed effect. This delay may have occurred if 
people only changed their medication the second time they went 
to the pharmacist, after having to pay the premium on their 
previous visit. This model found similar results, with no results that 
are both statistically significant and large (see Figure 6). 
 
                                            
67 Note that a dummy variable was included for the 2011 premiums and for the 
2012 premiums (which also results in two interaction variables). The results 
reported are for the premium that applied to each product. 
Figure 6: Regression results show that changes are not always 
statistically significant and are always small 
Coefficient (change in pure angiotensin II antagonists market share) 
 
Note: The five-digit PBS drug codes refer to individual doses. Change in slope is the 
coefficient for monthly trajectory change converted to an annual figure. 
Source: Grattan Institute  
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5.4 Price falls for angiotensin II inhibitors 
The analysis of price trends for products in the angiotensin II 
inhibitor therapeutic group covers the period from mid-2009 to 
mid-2014 (shortly before candesartan and irbesartan were 
removed from the therapeutic group). It draws on the same data 
sources described in section 5.1 and excludes under co-payment 
and closing the gap dispensing. 
The price used is the weighted average monthly treatment cost for 
each drug. We include premiums in calculating this price, as we 
are investigating the effect on the total price (to government and 
patients). As with the other analyses, only non-combination 
products are included. All authority products are excluded to avoid 
double-counting price changes for the same product. 
The analysis compares the average monthly decline for different 
categories of drug doses (each of which is scaled up to an annual 
figure): 
x all doses in the group 
x those that are the cheapest among substitutable doses 
x those that are the most expensive among substitutable doses. 
This analysis has some limitations. It is possible that greater falls 
among higher-cost products could be partly explained by 
reversion to the mean. In addition, our methodology is not the 
same as the Health Department’s. We do not use the same 
statistical tests to determine the degree of price differences and 
we have used different data (PBS dispensing data instead of 
surveys about prescribing). For this reason, out analysis may 
identify different drugs as the cheapest. 
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